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THROUGHOUT most of 1973, many analysts were
concerned about the prospects for what they called a
“growth recession” — a prolonged period where total
output continues to rise, but only at a fairly slow rate.
Indeed, the rate of growth of total product in the
economy has slowed substantially since early last year.
Now these fears have been compounded by reports of
widespread difficulty in securing production materials
and, more recently, sudden public awareness of the
nation’s energy problem. The situation has shifted to
one of fear of an imminent decline in economic ac-
tivity. While a great deal of attention is directed
toward the prospects for production and employment,
much concern is also being expressed about the ac-
celerated rise in prices in 1973. There is some fear
that actions to stimulate production might further ag-
gravate the inflation problem.
Recently, however, some analysts have claimed that
monetary actions threaten to restrict the expansion of
aggregate demand to an extent which would aggra-
vate any impending production and employment
problems. In part, this point of view is based on the
observation that the accelerated pace of inflation last
year exceeded the growth in the money stock, result-
ing in a decline in “real money balances” — money
divided by an index of prices.1
The argument is apparently based on the conten-
tion that the effect of changes in the money stock on
economic activity is transmitted through the public’s
lAn ironic development is that this argument is being ad-
vanced by economists who hold vastly different views on the
role of monetary actions in economic activity. For example,
First National City Bank of New York, which has usually
been identified with the monetarist position that monetary ac-
tions are a dominant force in the economy, has taken this
position. See ‘Energy: looking past the panic at the prob-
1cm,” Monthly Economic Letter, First National City Bank of
New York (December 1973), pp. 6-7. At the same time,
Professor Walter Heller, who has little sympathy for mone-
tarist precepts, has offered a similar analysis. See, for exam-
pie, his column, “Oil and the 1974 Economic Outlook,” Wall
Street Journal, 8 January 1974.
On January 31, 1974, the Board of Covernors of the Fed-
eral Reserve System released a revised series for the money
stock. The revision was based on a benchmark adjustment
for nonmember banks and revised seasonal adjustment factors.
The revised data show a faster rate of money growth in the
first half of 1973 than did the original data. As a consequence,
the level of real snoney balances did not decline as much as
had been thought earlier.
demand for these “real money balances”. The conclu-
sion is reached that, since the accelerated rate of
inflation last year has contributed to a reduction in
these real money balances, individuals have been re-
stricting their spending, and will continue to do so in
an attempt to rebuild the amount of “real” money
they hold. Some have suggested that this view implies
that monetary policy should be directed toward in-
creasing the rate of growth of the money stock above
that of the rate of inflation, thus restoring real money
balances to their former level.
In this context, the ratio of the money stock to some
current priceindex is alleged to be an indicator of the
thrust of monetary policy. As an indicator, the decline
in this ratio in 1973 has been offered by some ob-
servers as evidence that monetary actions in 1973 were
restrictive and, unless real balances are restored by ac-
celerated money growth, wifi lead to a reduction in
output and employment. This article shows that such
an interpretation of this ratio is misleading, at best, in
that a decline in real balances can be indicative of
either monetary restraint or stimulus. It is also shown
that attempts to control the stock of real balances are
extremely dangerous. The effort has been made in
other countries on other occasions, and in many in-
stances, has led to an ever accelerating rate of infla-
tion and eventual economic collapse.
REVIEW OF ECONOMIC SITUATION
Aggregate demand has increased steadily over the
past three years. Total spending in the economy rose
11.2 percent over the year ended in the fourth quar-
ter of 1973, compared to a 10 percent annual rate of
increase experienced in the previous two years. Over
most of the period since 1970, rapid expansion of ag-
gregate demand served to induce growth in production
from the depressed level of the 1969-70 recession. It
now appears, however, that the economy is close to its
short-term potential rate of production, with rapid ex-
pansion of demand eliciting smaller gains in output.2
tm
One element in the growth of aggregate demand last year
was a shift in the composition of demand. For example,
consumer preference has shifted toward smaller automobiles,
reflecting public doubt about future gasoline prices and
availability. The decline in spending for autos reflects, in part,
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The rate of increase in production over the 1971-72
period exceeded the estimated rate of growth of the
economy’s productive capacity — the combination of
such factors as increases in productivity, technology,
labor force, and productive facifities. Thus the rapid
expansion of demand served to induce more intensive
use of productive resources, encouraging new employ-
ment while allowing resources idled during the 1969-
70 recession to be re-employed. One aspect of this
expansion was reflected in the reported rate of unem-
ployment, which declined from 6 percent of the civil-
ian labor force in 1971 to an average of 4.7 percent in
the fourth quarter of last year.3
Total production in the economy increased at a 1.3
percent annual rate in the fourth quarter of last year,
according to preliminary estimates. The rate of out-
put growth began to slow early last year and produc-
tion increased at only a 2.4 percent rate from the first
to the fourth quarters in 1973. This is markedly slower
a decrease in demand for new ears. An additional factor has
been the inability of auto manufacturers to shift production
quickly from standard size ears to smaller cars. Inventory
stocks of large ears have increased substantially, while stocks
of smaller ears have been drawn down. The result has been
a sharp decline in production of automobiles and increased
unemployment in the industry. In this type of situation it is
difficult to detennine how much of the decline in production
is due to an absolute decline in consumer demand for cars
and how much is due to the inability to shift production to
meet a shift in consumer demand.
~The rate of unemployment rose to 5.2 percent of the labor
force in January 1974, reflecting cutbacks in employment in
automobile production, transportation, and service industries
which rely heavily on travel volume. It is too early to attribute
such a rise in unemployment to a general weakening of eco-
nomic activity, however, since much of the rise reflects the
shift in consumer preference away from energy-using
activities.
than the rate achieved over the prior two years, when
the average rate of increase of total production was in
excess of 6 percent.
As output growth slowed last year in the face of
steadily rising aggregate demand, the result was a
renewed acceleration in the rate of inflation.~The
average level of prices in the economy, as measured
by the deflator for gross national product, rose at a
7.9 percent annual rate in the fourth quarter and was
7.1 percent higher than a year earlier. The rate of in-
crease in prices during 1973 was more than double
the average 3.5 percent rate of increase reported over
the previous two years.
The general situation at the end of 1973 was that
output growth had slowed considerably and inflation
had accelerated anew. These are not two separate
problems, however. They are the joint result of the
rapid expansion of aggregate demand since 1970.
Sharp increases in aggregate demand throughout the
1971-73 period strained the ability of the productive
sector to keep pace. The imposition of price-wage con-
trols and the numerous shifts in control policy served
to further constrain the ability of the economy to
expand production to meet growing demands. The
recent embargo on oil shipments from the Middle-
4
While rapid expansion of aggregate demand served as the
catalyst for increases in the average level of prices last year,
several developments worked to intensify pressure on specific
prices in the economy. These developments, including in-
creased foreign demand for U.S. fami products, worked to
intensify changes in relative prices in the economy. There is
no doubt, for example, that the huge purchase of grain by the
Soviet Union last year contributed to the rise in food prices;
but such a transaction, unless accommodated by monetary
expansion, does not necessarily raise the average level of
prices in the economy.
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East was but one more element limiting the short-term
productive capacity of the economy.
TIlE ROLE OF MONEY AND REAL
BALANCES
The amount of money that individuals and busi-
nesses want to hold is a result of a decision about the
form in which wealth is held. Various types of assets
— money, bonds, equities, savings deposits, real assets,
and so forth — serve as a store of value, a means of
holding purchasing power.°They do not perform this
service equally well, however. In some situations real
assets serve better as a store of value than do mon-
etary assets, such as bonds and money. In other situa-
tions, it is relatively more advantageous to hold mone-
tary assets.” The proportion of wealth held in these
various assets reflects the attempt by individuals to
command maximum purchasing power, weighing
such factors as relative risk of default, expected
changes in relative prices, and expectations about the
average level of prices.
5
For a concise, but fairly complete, presentation of the ele-
ments which enter into the demand for money, see Milton
Friedman, “The Quantity Theory of Money — a Restate-
ment,” Studies in the Quantity Theory of Money, ed, Milton
Friedman (Chicagom University of Chicago Press, 1956),
pp. 4-15.
“Monetary assets are mole reliable as a store of value than
real assets during periods of unexpected changes in the rela-
tive prices of real assets. Consider, for example, the case in
late 1973 when the price of many equities fell and the price of
petroleum rose. Wealth held in the form of equities declined
while wealth held in the fonn of crude oil stocks rose.
Ignoring all other fonns in which they each held their wealth,
equity holders suffered a wealth loss and oil holders enjoyed
a wealth gain. Holders of money balances did not enjoy the
wealth increase which accrued to oil holders, but neither did
they suffer the loss absorbed by holders of equities. Thus
Besides serving as a store of value, money holdings
provide a convenience in that they are readily ac-
cepted in exchange for goods and services, Even in
periods when other assets serve better than money in
protecting purchasing power, money balances are still
desired as a means for reducing the cost of trans-
actions.
indzvzdaai and Aggrezrate Dnnand for Money
The demand for money, as both a store of value
and a means for facilitating transactions, is tempered
by the advantages which accrue to holders of other
forms of assets.7 By holding money balances, an in-
dividual sacrifices the services of other assets. Other
financial assets, for example, yield an explicit interest
income, which money balances do not, The higher the
rate of interest, the greater is the interest income
sacrificed by holding money. In addition, if prices of
goods and services are expected to rise in the future,
this interest income helps to offset some of the decline
in the purchasing power of monetary assets. Rising
money served as a hedge against such relative price move-
ments. If the choice was between holding money or oil, oil
was obviously a better store of value, and if the increase
in the price of oil had been foreseen by an individual, the
result would have been an increase in his deniand for a real
asset (oil) relative to his demand for a monetary asset
(money). For a review of the effects of commodity inflation
on various forms of wealth see Albert F. Burger, “The Ef-
fects of Inflation (1960-68),” this Review (November 1969),
pp. 25-36.
TThe demand for money to hold must not be confused with
the desire to borrow funds to spend. The former refers to
the average level of money balances that individuals and
businesses want to hold over some period of time. The de-
mand to borrow is the demand for credit, where the price of
borrowed funds is reflected in the rate of interest.
Money Stock
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interest rates would tend to decrease the quantity of
money balances an individual desires to hold relative
to other financial assets.
One individual in the economy has very little influ-
ence on average prices and interest rates. Being only
one among many in most markets, an individual essen-
tially buys and sells at quoted prices. An individual’s
desire to hold various assets, including money, reflects
attempts to adjust asset holdings to the prices cur-
rently prevailing as well as those expected in the
future.
What is true for an individual, however, is generally
not true for the economy as a whole. While an indi-
vidual is able to dispose of what he considers to be
excess money balances, such decisions do not substan-
tially change total money in the economy. The amount
of money in the economy is effectively determined by
the actions of the monetary authorities, and one indi-
vidual’s reduction in money balances creates excess
balances in someone else’s portfolio~8The second per-
son, in turn, attempts to exchange these balances for
other assets, and so on through the economy.
While éich individual is adjusting money balances
to prices and interest rates, the cumulative effect of
many persons attempting the same adjustment is pres-
sures on prices and interest rates. The pressure for
price change will continue until individuals find that
the cost of exchanging money for other assets exceeds
the expected return at the new set of prices and in-
terest rates. Thus individuals adjust money holdings
to prices, but for the economy, prices adjust to the
amount of moneyS
The ultimate effect of increases in the stock of
money is a higher level of prices in the economy.”
The relationship between the money stock and the
price level is quite close over extended periods; that
is, the trend rate of inflation is determined primarily
by the trend rate of money growth in the economy.
This effect is transmitted via the public’s demand for
money balances, resulting in changes in aggregate de-
mand for goods and services. The price which adjusts
~This is not to say that the monetary authorities can neces-
sarily control the stock of money exactly on a daily, weekly,
or even monthly basis. Over the course of a quarter, however,
changes in the stock of money are closely related to mone-
tary policy actions.
“This proposition has a bug tradition in economic litera-
ture. An informative comparison of money and price move-
ments over the past twenty years can be found in James M.
O’Brien, “Inflation and a Role for Monetary Policy,” Business
Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia (December
1973), pp. 3-11.
is the average level of prices. Not all prices are af-
fected equally and some change more than others.’°
Real Balances asan Indicator
The role of “indicators” in the formulation of sta-
bilization policy stems from the lack of complete in-
formation about the economy. Policymakers do not
know with certainty the effect that theft actions will
have on production, employment, and prices. They
require some readily available and reliable informa-
tion about the effect of their policy actions.31
For an individual, a rise in the ratio of money to
prices can occur in two ways. First, his money bal-
ances may suddenly rise faster than prices. For ex-
ample, he might receive a wage increase, resulting in
a larger paycheck. Secondly, the rate of change of
prices may unexpectedly rise slower than the rate at
which his money balances are growing. In either case,
his ratio of money to the price of other assets rises and
he attempts to adjust his portfolio.
We cannot generalize from individual behavior,
however, and say that when the ratio of money to
some price index in the economy rises, monetary
policy is stimulating economic activity, or when this
measure of real balances is falling, monetary policy
is restrictive. The problem with using the ratio of
money to an index of commodity prices, or financial
asset prices for that matter, is that this ratio is deter-
50Due to the diversity of tastes and preferences among eco-
nomic units, an increase in aggregate demand is not main-
lested equally across all markets. In addition, differences in
technology, expectations, and resource endowments in the
various markets result in different supply responses. The
combination of these factors results in larger increases in
demand in some markets than in others and also larger in-
creases in some prices than in others. In a smoothiy func-
tioning market economy resources move between markets in
responseto information about these changes in relative prices.
The movement of resources in response to the stimulus of
price change is constrained by several non-economic factors,
among which are legal institutions. The wage and price con-
trol program instituted in 1971, and pursued with varying
intensity since, is one such legal constraint. The effect of
these controls has been to distort the functioning of the
price system as an allocative device. Markets where prices
are controlled are unable to attract new resources to meet
demand increases, and persistent “shortages” develop. In
non-controlled markets, prices are bid higher in the short
run than they otherwise would be, as demand, unsatisfied
in controlled markets, shifts to markets where prices are not
controlled by government edict. The controls result in
changes in relative prices, but the average level of prices
rises just the same. The speed of adjustment of average
prices, however, might be altered. -
t1
An indicator serves a purpose much like that of a ther-
mometer which provides signals as to when more output is
needed from a tumace in order to maintain some desired
room temperature. For a discussion of the indicator problem
in monetary policy, see Albert E. Burger, “The Implementa-
tion Problem of Monetary Policy,” this Review (March
1971), pp. 20-30.
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mined by the public and is ultimately beyond the
control of the monetary authorities. In the long run 1IO\\ REAL D1tLAN(
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longer-term profit plans.1
2 As prices rise, “real bal-
ances” fall toward their former level, This fall, instead
of being indicative of monetary restriction, is actually
the result of prior monetary stimulus, Prices will con-
tinue to rise, and real money balances fall, until the
advantages gained by exchanging money for other
assets become too expensive, and people are willing
to hold the increased stock of money.’3
Real Money Balances in the Current Economy
The rate of money growth averaged a little over 6
percent from the fourth quarter of 1972 to the fourth
quarter of 1973. not much different from the average
rate of increase experienced over the previous five
years. As stated earlier, empirical evidence suggests
that the rate of average pricechange in the economy is
detennined by the trend rate of money growth over
the prior 4t o6years.14 On the basis of this evidence,
the rate of monetary expansion would have to fall
significantly below this trend rate before a “shortage”
of money developed at current prices and interest
rates, and aggregate demand was restricted suffi-
ciently to contribute to a decline in output and
employment.
The chart entitled “Annual Rates of Change of
Money” shows the quarter-to-quarter annual rate of
change of the money stock and the frend rate of
money growth, measured by a twenty-quarter moving
average of the rate of money growth. Twenty quarters
is selected as the period over which prices adjust to
equate the supply and demand for money balances.1’
The chart “Real Money Balances” shows that there
are five periods from 1955 to 1973 when the ratio of









or more: 1955-57, 1959-60, 1966, 1969, and 1973. Prior
to 1973, each period in which “real balances” declined
for two quarters or more was followed by a significant
slowdown in economic activity, ranging from the
1966-67 mini-recession to full-scale recessions in the
other periods.
It can be seen from the “Rates of Change of
Money” chart that in 1955-57, 1959-60, 1966, and 1969
a large portion of the decline in real balances reflected
a sharp drop in the rate of growth of the money stock
below its trend. The deceleration in money grosvth in
1973 was not as abrupt. Instead, the indicated decline
in “real balances” in 1973 reflected, in large part, the
reported acceleration of inflation.
Since the adjustment of prices to a change in the
trend rate of money growth is estimated to take from
four to six years to complete, it is probable that the
economy is still adjusting to the accelerated rate of
money growth over the period from 1971 to mid-
1973.’°Supporting evidence for this contention can be
found in the movement of interest rates in 1973.
An important element in the adjustment of prices
to an increased trend rate of money growth is the
adjustment of price expectations — a component of
long-term interest rates. The rate of interest on Aaa-
rated corporate bonds averaged 7,82 percent in Janu-
ary of this year, compared to 7.15 percent a year
earlier. If people currently expected inflation to aver-
age 7 percent over the next 10 to 20 years (the actual
rate of increase in 1973) then the current real rate of
interest on high grade bonds would be substantially
less than one percent, and would have declined sub-
stantially since 1972, when the expected rate of infla-
‘°Itcan be seen from the “Annual Rates of Change of Money”
chart that the trend rate of money growth has increased, on
batauce, since the mid-1950s. The trend rate reached 6
percent in late 1971 and has changed little since. The
money stock would have to grow at an average of 6 percent
for another couple of years to firmly establish a new trend
and altow prices to adjust completely.
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Denis S. Karnosky, “The Effect of Market Expectations on
Employment, Wages, and Prices,” Federal Reserve Bank




As prices rise the amount of money demanded increases
until the public is willing to hold the larger stock of money.
This is a movement along a demand curse to restore an
equilibrium. This is not to he confused with au increase in
the demand for money, a shift to the right of the demand
schedule In the latter case the public decides it wants to
hold more money balances at all prices Smith a shift would
result in the public decreasing its demand for uther assets
in an attem-;t to increase its money balances. The effect is a
restriction of aggregate demand. In the former case, aggre-
gate demand is stimulated.
145
ee Leonall C. Andersen and Denis S. Karnosky, “The
Appropriate Time Frame for Controlling Monetary Aggre-
gates: The St. Louis Evidence,” Controlling Monetary Ag—
gregates II: The Implementation, Conference Series No 9,
Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, 1972, pp 147-77.
~
5
Ibid., pp. 147-77. This selection is not completely arbitrary,
bat is the mid-point of the range suggested by empirical
investigations.
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lion was presumably much less than 7 percent. This
seems highly improbable.
It is more likely that, while the sharp acceleration
in the rate of commodity inflation in 1973 was not
expected by most people, average expectations of
the long-term rate of inflation were not revised up-
ward to the full extent of the 1973 inflation.17 The
longer the rate of inflation remains at 7 percent,
however, the more the expectations of inflation would
be revised upward. An increase in the expected rate
of inflation would tend to decrease the amount of
money demanded, in any event, as real assets and
non-money assets become more attractive relative to
money as stores of purchasing power. The change in
expectations would then put further upward pressure
on prices.
The inflation of last year, instead of threatening to
restrict aggregate demand by eroding real money bal-
ances below desired levels, reflects the efforts of the
17
There is some evidence that short-term price expectations
are not of the magnitude of 1973 rate of inflation. In one
survey taken in November of last year, the consensus was
that the implicit price deflator for GNP would rise at a 5.1
percent annual rate from the fourth quarter of 1973 to the
fourth quarter of 1974. See J.A. Livingston, “Prospects for
1974? The Economists Can’t Agree,” The Philadelphia In-
quirer, 30 December 1973.
There is also a strong possibility that current price indices
overstated the acceleration of inflation in 1973, While there
can be no doubt that many prices rose dramatically last
year, food prices for example, the aggregate indices are not
sufficiently flexible to capture the effects of shifts in de-
mand. Given the perverse effect of price controls, the actual
rate of increase of commodity prices, on average, was prob-
ably somewhat higher than reported in 1971-72 and some-
what lower in 1973. As measured by the CNP deflator,
prices rose at an average annual rate of 4.7 percent over
the three years ended in the fourth quarter of 1973. The
actual rate of inflation was probably a bit below this in 1971
and somewhat above in 1973. This is difficult to document,
but it is consistent with the types of price forecasts being
made by various observers,
public to dispose of excess money balances. On the
basis of past experience, if the money stock continued
to grow at about the 6 percent annual rate observed
in 1973, this adjustment would continue for another
year or two.
The arguments which contend that monetary policy
is restrictive, on the basis of the recent decline in
“real money balances,” imply a recommendation to
increase the rate of money growth above the rate of
inflation in order to restore the growth of real bal-
ances. Both theoretical analysis and the experience
of other countries indicate that there are few more
dangerous courses of action that any monetary au-
thority could undertake.
The stock of money is determined by the monetary
authorities, but the stock of “real balances” is essen-
tially determined by the behavior of the public. In or-
der to achieve some level of “real balances” the mone-
tary authorities would have to be able to control the
price level, independently of the stock of money out-
standing. Monetary authorities do not have that
power. The stock of money and the rate of price
change are intimately related, in that any attempt to
force the public to hold larger money balances than
they desire ultimately results in accelerating inflation,
A further increase in the rate of money growth,
above its recent average rate of 6 percent per annum,
would only generate pressure for further inflation. It
is not possible to avoid the adjustment of real money
balances to the level desired by the public by increas-
ing the rate of money growth.’8
SUMMARY
The slowdown in the growth of output in the econ-
omy since early last year reflects, in large part, the
constraints on production stemming from a generally
high level of resource utilization and the perverse
effects of price control programs. Severe limitation of
growth in energy supplies would work to further this
constriction of output potential for at least a short
time, Aggregate demand continues to grow rapidly,
however, and inflationary pressure is strong.
‘
5
As an extreme example of the futility of such a policy, dur-
ing the German hyper-inflation of 1920-23, the monetary
authorities interpreted the long hnes of persons waiting for
bank notes as indicative of a currency shortage. In order to
meet the cash requirements at the existing prices they sought
to increase the supply of money faster than prices were
rising. The approach was to print ever larger denominations
of currency and speed the output rate of their printing
presses. See Frank D. Graham, Exchange, Prices, and Pro-
duction in Hyper-Inflation: Germany 1920-23 (New York:
Russell & Russell, 1930), pp. 104-7.
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The danger in using “real money balances” as an
indicator of the thrust of monetary actions in the cur-
rent situation is that these balances can give very
misleading information. Movements in real balances
reflect the adjustment of pubhc behavior to discrep-
ancies between desired and actual money balances.
The monetary authorities, although able to control
the growth of money in the economny, are not able to
secure lasting changes in real balances which are in-
consistent with public demand. Ultimately, prices will
adjust to frustrate any such efforts. As prices adjust
upward the stock of “real money balances” will tend
to decline. This fall, instead of being indicative of
monetary restraint, reflects prior monetary stimulus.
Temporary changes in real balances, above levels
desired by the public, can be achieved, since the
public does not immediately adjust their expectations
or their behavior, and price increases will tend to lag
behind. The historical record of Gennany, Austria,
Hungary, the American Confederacy, and many other
economies is frightening evidence of the futility of
trying to increase money faster than prices are rising.
All of these economies experienced declining “real
balances” while their respective money stocks were
increasing explosively.
This article is available as Reprint No. 84.
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